



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die bewusste Beziehung zwischen Vorstellungen als konstitutives Bewusstseinsmoment. Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Denkerscheinungen.
Von DR. ERNST SCHRADER. Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1893.
— 8vo., pp. xii, 84.

Dr. Schrader is a writer in whom the German vices of over-formality and punctiliousness of method almost eclipse the German virtues of acuteness and profundity. His results seem to me undeniably true, however, and corroborative of theses which I have set forth in my own *Principles of Psychology*, so I am glad to call the reader's attention to this, his maiden work.

He begins by asking how much of the material present to consciousness at any one time can be called a single idea. Is the table with the pencil on it one idea, or two ideas? If two, why then is not the table itself, with its four distinct legs and top, five ideas? etc., etc. He decides that the test of unity in a percept or concept is *functional*: whatever objects of consciousness *act together* in determining what further associates shall be reproduced, must be considered as forming on that occasion a complex unity. Whenever the pencil calls up associates of its own exclusively, then it is an idea by itself; whenever, whilst on the table, it reminds us of So-and-so who always keeps pencils upon his table, then it is part of the complex idea 'table + pencil.' This point settled, Dr. Schrader takes three simple examples out of his own experience, and, seeking to explain the sequence of thoughts and acts in them by the laws of association rigorously applied, finds that the latter cannot be made entirely to suffice. Schematically stated, these cases are examples either of the fact that whereas neither *a* nor *b* singly will suggest *c* to the mind, both together will suggest *c*; or of the fact that *a* singly may suggest *c*, but that when *b* adds itself to *a*, *c* is expelled and *d* is suggested in its place. The result of Dr. S.'s discussion is first to show that a bead-like string of single ideas following each other by association will explain none of these cases, and that the least we can suppose, as the antecedent in any such reproduction, is a complex idea, *a + b*. But Dr. S. then shows that where *a + b* actually drives out a *c* which had been suggested by *a* alone, we must suppose more than this, we must suppose a repugnancy, a 'negative relation,' namely, between the *b* and the *c*, which repugnancy does not merely act *mechanically* as it would if it simply made us *forget c*, but acts *consciously* by forcing us to feel *c*'s incompatibility and to seek for another consort for the given *a + b*. [In the case given, *a* is a retinal picture which first suggests 'lady';

but presently *a* is perceived to be attached to *b*, a wheelbarrow, whereupon 'lady' is corrected into 'workman.'] Consciously realized *negative relations* being thus proved necessary to the complete determination of certain thought-sequences, Dr. S. tries to show that *positive relations* must also be felt between the elements *a*, *b*, and *c* of the mental sequence in the other examples, relations such that, if they were changed, the same sequences would not result. That the relations cannot be clearly represented by themselves in abstraction from their terms is no ground for denying their existence before the mind, for such an argument would also lead us to deny the existence of emotional feelings, which notoriously cannot be reproduced in abstraction from objects. The causes of association work subconsciously, calling up and expelling ideas ; but the ideas called up and expelled are not insulated mental atoms, for as we become conscious of them we become also conscious of their relations *inter se*, and to different felt relations different associative processes belong. This is what our author means by calling consciousness of relations a 'constituent element' of our thought. — For remarks on 'apperception' and 'judgment' see the work itself. It is shrewd and sound, but too pedantic. There are some theories not worth dislodging by a siege *en règle* with its length and all its apparatus ; and the theory that we have no consciousness of relations is surely one of them.

WILLIAM JAMES.

Grundriss einer einheitlichen Trieblehre vom Standpunkte des Determinismus. Von JULIUS DUBOC. Leipzig, 1892. Otto Wigand. — pp. xiv, 308.

A work that boldly takes as its motto the maxim "Thue was du willst," would seem to offer a solution of various troublesome problems, upon which, however, the present endeaemonistic "Impulse-Theory" cannot be said to throw much new light. The main body of the book is divided into four parts. In the first of these, on Conscience, the writer states the deterministic thesis that all action is the result of impulse, and defines conscience as the impulse to preserve the logical unity of the individual nature. Disobedience to conscience means self-contradiction, logical suicide. Part Second treats, with much repetition and digression, of the relation of impulse to pleasure. Every impulse when gratified results in pleasure; when inhibited, in pain. When conscience is resisted, the resulting pain is that of self-annihilation, which it is human nature to avoid at any cost. In Part Third the *summum bonum* is discussed, and defined as that which all humanity desires. But the whole race can agree in desiring only what is in accordance with the supreme law of its nature; hence obedience to conscience, the most universal impulse, is necessary to the attainment of the highest good.

The last section of the book is entitled Man and Humanity. The moral progress of mankind, according to the writer, consists in increasing recogni-